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The governance of French towns. From the centre-
periphery scheme to urban regimes
This article defends the idea that it is no longer satisfactory to study the forms of
governance of the French cities through the centre-periphery analytical framework.
The devolution of new functions to urban governments, the transformations on
capitalism, and States’ policies have turned French cities from mere implementation
spaces of public policies built at other levels to central actors on urban policy
production. The horizontal relationships connecting urban actors might be the first
explanation for new scopes and shapes of local urban policies. It is therefore
legitimate to study urban governance and policies in French cities through theoretical
tools granting a primary role to the interactions between urban actors and groups and
to the conflicts and coalitions in which they are involved. Amongst these theoretical
tools the urban regimes approach seems particularly promising.
Keywords: France; centre-peripheries relationships; governance; urban regimes.
A governança das cidades francesas. Das lógicas centro-
-periferia para os regimes urbanos
Este artigo defende que as lógicas de governança das cidades francesas já não podem
ser interpretadas apenas à luz dos quadros analíticos de centro-periferia. A atribuição
de novas funções aos governos urbanos, as transformações no capitalismo, e as
políticas do Estado reposicionaram as cidades francesas de espaços de mera execução
de políticas públicas desenhados noutras escalas, para actores centrais na produção de
políticas urbanas. As relações horizontais conectando os actores urbanos podem ser
a primeira explicação para novos âmbitos e formas das políticas urbanas locais.
Torna-se assim legítimo analisar a governança urbana e as políticas nas cidades
francesas através de ferramentas teóricas que confiram um papel central às interacções
entre os agentes e os grupos urbanos e aos conflitos e coligações que desenvolvem.
Entre estas ferramentas teóricas, a abordagem dos regimes urbanos mostra-se
particularmente promissora.
Palavras-chave: França; relações centro-periferia; governança; regimes urbanos.
INTRODUCTION
This article defends and illustrates the idea according to which studying
the way French towns and cities are governed through the mere centre-
periphery relationships analytical framework is no longer appropriate. This
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approach, which has long prevailed in Europe and particularly in France,
considers that the “vertical” relationships between the state’s central and
field administrations, on the one hand, and the local political actors and local
administrators, on the other, are the most important facets to consider in
order to understand the way localities are governed. Besides, this framework
attributes a decisive importance to the regulation and policymaking functions
of central state representatives and tends, in parallel, to neglect the “horizon-
tal” dynamics of mobilisation, alliance, and conflict entwining local actors,
whether political or socio-economic. This approach is intimately linked to the
history of the construction of territorial states in Europe which was char-
acterised by the progressive expansion of centres into initially rebellious
peripheries (Elias, 1975; Tilly & Blockmans, 1994). The challenges of mili-
tary and political control of these peripheries prevailed for such a long period
of time that they justified both institutional arrangements intended to limit the
power and responsibilities of local governments and interpretative schemes
emphasising the influence of the central state representatives.
The recent evolution in the relationships between the state and local
governments and in policymaking processes, along with the transformations
in capitalism and its relationships with urban spaces and the evolution of
urban societies require a reassessment of the way French cities’ governance
is analysed. The attribution of an ever increasing number of functions to
urban governments, the competition between cities triggered by globalised
capitalism, and state policies more concerned with competitiveness than with
redistribution, have made French cities not just spaces for the implementa-
tion of public policies but also actors in the elaboration of the policies and
the strategic visions inspiring them. Local actors (elected officials, civil
servants, economic actors, social movements and associations) are no
longer in a subordinate position regarding the determination and implemen-
tation of urban policies. The “horizontal” relationships linking those local
actors can now be considered as the first explanation of the content of urban
policies and of the way they are conceived and implemented. Therefore, it
seems legitimate to henceforth approach urban policy/policies in France
through theoretical tools that attribute a fundamental role to the horizontal
interactions between urban actors, groups and organisations, as well as to
the conflicts, alliances, and coalition logics in which they are bound up as
factors explaining the structure of the urban agenda and the content of urban
policies. Amongst these theoretical tools, the “urban regimes” approach
developed in the United States by Clarence Stone (1989; see also Orr &
Johnson, 2008) and his followers seems particularly fruitful. The merits of
this approach will be subsequently presented in this article, but we can
already state that one of them is the fact that it consents to the articulation
of a political economy approach, sensitive to the structuring character of the
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capitalist framework, with a political science approach attentive to the po-
litical and social logics that shape urban policy and policies, whilst also not
overestimating the role played by the influence of upper government tiers.
In this article, I shall first consider the theoretical approaches that have
dominated the social science literature on local government in France and
present the empirical reality — establishing strong asymmetries in the rela-
tionships between the state and localities — in which these approaches were
rooted. I shall demonstrate how these approaches have left strong imprints
on contemporary scientific production, whereas the empirical substratum at
their origin has been substantially modified. In the second part, I shall
consider how the transformations which occurred before and after the 1982
decentralisation laws finally allowed alternative analytical frameworks to
emerge. These approaches and the governance approach in particular, have
permitted the re-evaluation of the role played by urban actors in the govern-
ance of cities. In this section, I shall plead for an extension of these works
through the deployment of urban regimes research programme and theory.
Finally, in a third and last part, I shall seek to widen the subject to places
beyond France and examine the possibility of defining and qualifying South-
ern European urban regimes.
THE LONG GOODBYES TO THE “LOCAL POLITICAL ADMINISTRA-
TIVE SYSTEM”
The notion of a “local political administrative system” is part of the
theoretical frameworks that have long dominated the approach to local poli-
tics in France. Developed by the researchers of Michel Crozier’s Centre de
Sociologie des Organisations (CSO), this notion refers to an approach that
conceives of local political life, urban politics, and local actors only through
the issue of their relationships of dependence and submission to central state
representatives and their attempts to skirt the rules imposed by the centre.
This kind of approach has profoundly marked the French way of dealing
with cities and urban policies.
THE EROSION OF LOCAL AUTONOMY
Nevertheless, we must recognise that the approach which favours the
dependent relationship between “local” and “state-national” is rooted in an
empirical and historical reality that has witnessed the continued erosion of
local autonomy, in particular that of cities, as a central power asserted itself,
firstly royal, then imperial, and lastly republican. While it has undoubtedly
been weaker than in Middle Europe (Italy, Rhineland Germany, Flanders),
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the communal movement nevertheless did touch France. In the “historic
interlude” (Weber, 1982) that separates the fall of the Roman empire and the
failure of the Carolingian attempts to re-establish a Christian West on the one
hand, and the emergence of nation states in the 14th century, certain French
towns liberated themselves from feudal bondage and the power of the Bish-
ops and obtained franchises and privileges from the crown (Chédeville et al.,
1980). An urban consular power quite close to the city-state model was
established, in particular in areas of what today makes up Southern France.
However, this communal movement was not sufficiently robust to oppose
the influence of the rural nobility and the precocious emergence of a cen-
tralised royal power, which from the 16th century onward, progressively
corroded the city privileges and replaced consular powers with those of
crown representatives. Royal absolutism then brought a definitive end to this
historic interlude.
The revolutionary period, and later the imperial episode, proved unfavour-
able to urban powers and worsened, rather than corrected, the process of
centralisation. The revolution created the communes which, while again
taking up the structure of the Catholic Church parishes, founded the basis
for the eternal problem of extreme communal fragmentation (41,000 at the
time of the Revolution and still 35,568 today). In its rationalistic logic, this
endowed all communes with the same status, be they urban or rural. Fur-
thermore, the urban power legitimately associated with the power of the
mercantile corporations and, therefore, with intermediary bodies, was not
reinstated by the revolutionary governments. The administrative power was
transferred to the State representative, above all the prefects created in 1800.
Neither the Empire nor the restored 19th century monarchies ran counter to
this centralising tendency. On the contrary, even if the municipal elections
suspended in 1797 were reinstated in the 1830s under the Restoration, the
19th century was characterised on the one hand by a strengthening of the
central state and its military and civilian infrastructures and, on the other
hand, by the unification of the public national space, thanks to the develop-
ment of the press and parliamentarism, all factors that prove in no way
favourable to any resurgence in urban power.
One has to wait for the stabilisation of the Republican regime from 1875
onward to encounter a new historical window of opportunity more favour-
able to the re-emergence of urban powers. The founders of the new regime
carried the explicit intention of reducing the central state apparatus, compro-
mised by its participation in the Imperial regime, and in order to achieve that,
backed the construction of the Republic “from the bottom up” and, in
particular, from the commune level. An era then began that some call the
“town hall era” (Politix, 2001). The communes obtained the freedom of
action to innovate in matters of public policies. That period saw towns —
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not central State — invent urban planning (Gaudin, 1985) and trace the
outline of the Welfare State. This capacity for innovation was also exercised
during the first decades of the 20th century in the field of economic devel-
opment, in particular in the communes directed by socialists willing to ex-
periment with a French style “municipal socialism”.
Nevertheless, that emancipative drive of the urban powers swiftly got
broken by censorship of the Conseil d’Etat, the judicial body responsible for
the control of the legality of government actions, and the return in force of
the central state apparatus between the two wars. This movement toward
recentralisation was confirmed by the Vichy Regime, which “nationalised”
urban planning and made the central state a key actor in urban and construc-
tion policies. However, it was particularly with the 4th Republic (1946-1958)
and even more especially so with the 5th Republic (1958-…) that the
process of centralisation and the reduction of local governments’ room for
manoeuvre attained their high-water mark. Immediately after the war, an elite
consensus emerged favourable to the construction of a powerful interven-
tionist social state able to rebuild the country and to orientate its economy.
The 4th Republic laid the foundations with nationalisations, the foundation of
the social security system, and the creation of a powerful planning agency:
the Commissariat Général au Plan. The 5th Republic, under de Gaulle, even
reinforced the central State by systematising the powers of the state’s upper
echelons over an increasingly extended range of social activities and eco-
nomic sectors (Jobert & Muller, 1987; François, 2008). This interventionist
State, a kind of “revival” of Colbertism, also took on urban and regional
challenges, and implements what Brenner (2004), in accordance with Martin
(1989), qualified as “spatial Keynesianism”. Amongst the main institutional
developments of these political strategies is the creation of the Délégation
Interministériel à l’Aménagement du Territoire et à l’Action Régionale
(DATAR) in 1963, an agency meant to contain the growth of the Paris
region and to orchestrate the industrialisation of the poorest regions and
equip them with modern infrastructure. During this period, the central state
also took control of most of the planning, housing, and infrastructure poli-
cies in cities.
The gradual rise in power of an interventionist and planning state goes
hand in hand with the stabilisation of a specific power system associating
state representatives and local officials, which sociologists from CSO termed
the “local political-administrative system” (système politico-administratif lo-
cal — SPAL) (Worms, 1966; Grémion, 1976). This system was mainly char-
acterised by its asymmetry, given the sharp resource inequalities between
state representatives richly endowed with financial and technical means as
well as the legitimacy for action, on the one hand, and the elected local
722
Gilles Pinson
authorities and local civil servants who were progressively deprived of such
resources as state interventionism grew on the other.
That intervention has, in fact, deprived local actors, including those in
towns, of their capacity for taking initiatives and innovating in matters of
public policies. Their role was progressively limited to maintaining a local
consensus and acting as intermediary between local society and state admin-
istrations. Even if the few local elected officials accumulating local and
national mandates — as the French system allows — were able to obtain
adjustments to the state policies, even if the associations of elected local
entities and in particular the Association of the Mayors of France (Associa-
tion des Maires de France — AMF) allowed mayors to influence the leg-
islation concerning local communities (Le Lidec, 2001), even if thanks to
their presence in Parliament — and in particular in the Senate — elected local
authorities were able to block attempts at reforming the local institutional
system, overall, the state central and field services had acquired a strong and
almost monopolistic grip over urban matters. The central technocratic elites
of the de Gaulle regime at the time considered the elected local officials as
forces that resist change and modernisation and the département Prefects as
their allies. Thus came the idea of promoting the regional level as the new
scale for central state action and establishing powerful agencies such as
DATAR, capable of overcoming obstructions put in place by local elites.
Naturally, such developments did nothing to improve the status of “local”
matters as far as social sciences studies are concerned. Along with the
sociologists of the CSO, some political scientists (Lagroye, 1973) depicted
the elected local officials as busier consolidating electoral strongholds and
mobilising the consensus in local society around state policies rather than
trying to innovate or elaborate projects for their territory. In the 1960s and
the 1970s, French urban sociology, when it was not totally insensitive to the
political dimension, portrayed local political actors and administrators as
totally marginalised by a central power that was carrying out an in-depth
reorganisation of urban spaces for the benefit of the major national industrial
groups (Castells and Godard, 1974).
DECENTRALISATION AND SURVIVAL OF ANALYTICAL MODELS
Paradoxically, the decentralisation laws of 1982 and 1983, which con-
siderably upset the country’s institutional architecture and centre-periphery
relations, did not fundamentally transform the outlook of the social sciences
on local and urban policies. Voted through at the beginning of the first
presidential mandate of socialist François Mitterrand (1981-1988), these laws
nevertheless carried important changes: they put an end to prefect tutelage
over the acts of local communities, replacing control over opportunities by
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a mere judicial control over the conformity of acts; they transferred strategic
competences from state services to the local governments (the communes
inherited urban planning, transportation, and social action, amongst other
competences); and they made the rules for matters such as staff recruitment
and access to credit more flexible. However, one should not attribute more
importance to this surge in decentralisation than it actually bore in reality.
The law did, more often than not, simply legally validate an evolution that had
already begun back in the 1960s and which witnessed a gradual strengthening
on the part of certain local communities in their capacity to produce public
policies. What Lorrain (1989 and 1991) has qualified as a “silent change”,
above all, involved large cities which, even before decentralisation, had held an
autonomous capacity for innovation and action in sectors where state services
had invested little: public transportation, economic development, the rehabili-
tation of rundown housing stock, culture, social action, etc.
However, Lorrain’s findings have remained relatively isolated in French
literature concerning local policies. Despite decentralisation, most scholars
remained obsessed with the social figure of the “notables”, i.e. those archaic
and omnipotent local elected officials able to monopolise relations with the
centre. In the years following the reform, a certain number of studies drew
stern conclusions regarding decentralisation  (Rondin, 1986; Mény, 1987,
1992; Mabileau, 1991): rather than a democratisation of local political
spaces and a strengthening of innovation in local policies, decentralisation
further increased the already considerable power of some “notables” —
mayors, presidents of general and regional councils — who recycle the same
logic of action that they already practiced prior to centralisation consisting
of favouring and courting the centre rather than mobilising those forces
constituting local societies to promote a local development project. Accord-
ing to those studies, the decentralisation reforms missed their target. Terri-
torial fragmentation, the quite undemocratic character of decision making
systems, and the weak mobilisation of local resources within the fabric of
public policies remained, according to those studies, important traits of local
political systems.
If this kind of analysis, which continues to prevail in French academic
fields interested in local and town policies, in particular in the political sci-
ence field, is certainly the reflection of an empiric reality characterised
especially by the weight of executives in local institutions, it is also the
product of a rooted way to focus on elected officials and institutions and to
systematically underestimate the polycentric and pluralist character of urban
societies when looking at urban policies that still prevails. Not only does the
“hold of the state curb the decentralisation of the outlook” as Cadiou indi-
cates (2009, p. 35; see also Briquet and Sawicki, 1989), but even when the
urban policies and politics are taken into consideration, the majority of
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French political science studies, routinely endow the elected entities, the
political institutions, the logics of political competition, and the building of
electoral strongholds with a highly privileged role. It is very much the case
with the studies carried out during the 1980s and the 1990s in accordance
with the research by Lagroye (1973) on Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Mayor of
Bordeaux from 1947 to 1995. One has to recognise that those studies
(Petaux, 1982; Garraud, 1989) contain the huge merit of having updated the
conditions under which the profession is exercised by the local elected
officials and, in particular, that of the logic of the construction of “eligibility”
(Abélès, 1989), of mobilising supports, and of constructing electoral strong-
holds. They have demonstrated that local spaces are actually political spaces.
Nevertheless, one can reproach them over two biases. First, the approach
to urban government is systematically centred on elected officials and on the
“politics” side of their activities. Whereas, with a few exceptions (Fontaine
and Le Bart, 1994), issues such as local administrations management, the
construction of projects, and the activation and coordination of public poli-
cies are often neglected. This focus on issues, spaces, and practices of
electoral competition tends, therefore, to render urban societies invisible, to
neglect the materiality of the city and the set of problems that urban political
actors may be faced with when dealing with urban society and materiality.
Finally, despite the clearly sociological orientation of the studies, local soci-
eties are not made more palpable when compared to previous works. They
are reduced to pools of resources to which the elected officials resort in order
to confront electoral competition. Furthermore, these studies perpetuate a very
French tendency to dilute the urban issue and its potential specificities in the
generic and unsatisfying category of the “local”. This lack of differentiation
between local spaces is, once again, indicative of the difficulty of the social
sciences in France when studying local policies to recognise the spaces and
urban societies as realities that pose specific problems to the political powers.
This difficulty that the social sciences, and more specifically French
political science, have in conceiving cities as potentially specific political
spaces contrasts with the precocious constitution of the city, of the urban
policy/policies as specific objects in the North American social sciences
field.  In the United States, the different forms of the State’s construction,
the rapid establishment of towns as “separate” political spaces (given the
anti-urban ideology of the WASP majority, the greater presence of ethnic
minorities, the establishment of urban political machines, etc.) has led re-
searchers not only to pay more attention to the specificities of political life
in the city, but also to the specific means of engaging in and implementing
urban policies within a social context marked by racial cleavages, the role
of large companies, and the logic of property or, furthermore, the exodus
of the white middle classes to the suburbs and the secessionism of privileged
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enclaves. Even if this way of postulating the specificity of urban policy/
policies may have led to a certain isolation of the urban politics community
within the field of North American political science (Sapotichne et al.,
2007), it has, nevertheless, had the merit of repositioning urban societies and
their specific characteristics at the centre of studies on urban politics.
GOVERNANCE AND URBAN REGIMES
The two decades since 1990 have witnessed an evolution in the way
French cities are governed and the urban policies made on the one hand, and
an evolution in the way social sciences look at these subjects on the other.
The most striking sign of this change in outlook is the dissemination of an
approach in terms of urban governance. Today, evolutions in the forms of
governance of French towns justify the taking of a new theoretical step that
looks at cities as spaces governed by regimes.
FROM SPAL TO URBAN GOVERNANCE
The “système politico-administratif local” has had its day! The way the
social sciences view local political spaces must, therefore, change. Whilst a
certain number of significant traits of this “system” remain — in particular
the fragmentation of the communes and the dominant role played by local and
regional government executives — many other aspects of these local political
spaces have changed considerably.
The first of these changes concerns the widening of local government
competences and the reinforcement, in particular regarding large cities, of
their technical and political ability to conceive and implement public policies.
The decentralisation legislation certainly enacted a distribution of
competences between levels of territorial communities but they also left
unchanged a principle of “general competence” which has been in effect
since the 19th century and which, in effect, provides the scope for interven-
tion in a great many fields across every possible level. Large towns have,
therefore, been able to develop their intervention in areas such as economic
development, social assistance, housing, and culture, but also in the building
and maintenance of university and judicial structures. During the years fol-
lowing decentralisation, these innovations were often the work of enterpris-
ing mayors, or indeed adventurers, sometimes acting in legally grey areas
and, in some cases, even subsequently facing court cases. Later, certain
public sectors underwent restructuring thanks to the advent of better trained
urban professional bureaucracies; thanks also to the constitution of profes-
sional networks allowing for, on a national level, the circulation of expertise
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on urban policies; and thanks equally to the refinement of internal and
external financial control mechanisms. This reinforcement of the capacity
for action on the part of communities, and in particular of larger cities,
means that today local and regional governments are responsible for more
than 70% of public investment expenditure.
The second major factor of change is the increase in power of the inter-
municipal cooperation institutions, in particular in the urban context. Even
before the decentralisation laws, because of the high level of fragmentation
of the municipality map, some of them regrouped within these institutions,
enabling them to jointly manage a number of services, networks, and utilities
(transport, waste collection and treatment, water supply and sanitation) and
to perform a certain number of strategic functions (urban planning, eco-
nomic development, housing, etc.) on a larger scale, all without jeopardising
the legitimacy of the communal space as the basic unit of local democracy
(Baraize and Négrier, 2001; Desage, 2005). Therefore, France has followed
the general tendency to favour the metropolitan governance formulas of
what has been termed “neo-regionalism” (Savitch and Vogel, 2009), consist-
ing of a middle way between the solution of generalised competition between
communities advocated by the public choice supporters and metropolitan
government formulas that consist of transferring essential functions and
resources from the communes to supra-communal institutions governed by
directly elected councillors. The political functioning of those new institu-
tions is of an inter-governmental type and does, in fact, attribute a prominent
role to the mayors of each municipality in inter-communal policy negotia-
tions. The state has played an essential role in the acceleration of this inter-
communal regrouping process, playing up financial incentives as well as
threats of sanction. However, one must not neglect the role that shared and
established working habits (acquired earlier within a framework of more
malleable formulas of inter-communal cooperation) play in this process, as
well as the socialising effect of inter-communal cooperation devices for
planning and visioning, which have led elected entities to incorporate and
internalise a need for cooperation.
The third element of change impacting on town government is the pro-
gressive delegation by the state of the “strategic direction” guiding the pro-
duction of urban policies toward local actors. At the beginning of the 1980s,
the decentralisation laws gave a legal frame to the retreat of the “dirigiste”,
planning and controlling central state and to the inexorable rise of the largest
cities as political actors. The end of the de Gaulle era and the beginnings of
the 1974 crisis marked the end of a development cycle for the state as
planner. DATAR lost its influence and the central state as a whole experi-
enced increasing difficulties in formulating a new project for the organisation
of the national territory (Béhar and Estèbe, 1999). The revival of planning
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in a regionalised and contractual format continued after decentralisation had
little impact. Henceforth, it was to be cities and regions charged with the
task of elaborating development strategies. Territorial projects can therefore
only be local. That is how, throughout the last three decades, we have seen
towns and inter-communal institutions expand their services to encompass
economic development and carry out economic policies (Le Galès, 1993),
revive spatial and strategic planning (Padioleau and Demeestere, 1991), de-
velop international relations and marketing policies, and submit applications
to organise major events. Therefore, French cities and urban societies have
acquired the capacity to think independently and project themselves in an
environment that has become more uncertain and more competitive. In
short, they have learnt to elaborate visions and projects (Pinson, 2009a).
Finally, the last factor of evolution concerns the process of pluralisation
that has affected French urban policy networks, in other words, the mul-
tiplication of actors intervening in the fabric of urban policies and city
governance, plus the consequent dispersion of resources for action (Pinson,
2006). Whereas these action systems had remained relatively simple up until
the 1970s and were essentially concentrated around state field services,
elected officials and, in a secondary way, municipal services, they later
became much more complex, with the increase in power of semi-public
agencies and companies that gravitated around the administrations, taking
over new fields of action, with the growing power of local branches of
major real estate groups and urban utilities, with the new energy of certain
organisations that represent economic actors or, furthermore, with the pro-
gressive autonomy of the state’s local administrations, such as ports or
universities, that play an increasingly important role in local projects and
local development strategies.  This proliferation of actors was accompanied
by a dispersion of resources — financial, political, of expertise — permitting
these actors to influence the drafting and implementation of urban policies.
In order to make that pluralisation compatible with the constitution of a
capacity for collective action, urban political actors had to innovate in terms
of public action instruments, and we saw in the 1990s and 2000s the use
of forms of action based on negotiation, deliberation, and repetition, such as
contracts, projects, and other prospective initiatives (Gaudin, 1999; Pinson,
2004) becoming generalised.
In the French academic field, a new generation of researchers tried, in
the 1990s, in line with the already quoted works by Lorrain, and often
inspired by North American studies, to make the analysis of local political
spaces more sensitive to the specificity of urban societies, to the logic of
pluralisation gripping them, and also to the possible effects of the transfor-
mations of capitalism. Lorrain (1990 and 2002) documented the growing
power of “infrastructure firms” such as Générale des Eaux (which became
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Veolia) and Lyonnaise des Eaux (which became Suez). In his studies of local
policies for economic development, Le Galès (1993) focused on the impor-
tance of the “locality effect” and more precisely on the role of local
mobilisations and interactions between urban social groups to explain the
content of these policies. Afterwards, inspired by the American political
economy approach to city governance, he proposed the renewal of the
approach of urban policies using the term “governance”, a notion able to
encapsulate the phenomena of the pluralisation of urban actors in conjunc-
tion with the decentring of public actors and regulations in urban production
and management and instrumental innovation in urban policies (Le Galès,
1995). Borraz has explored, with an organisations sociology approach, the
phenomenon of organisational proliferation in urban action systems and the
renewal of practices by elected urban officials to cope with this new reality
(Borraz, 1998; Borraz and John, 2004). More recently, researchers have
tried to apply neo-Marxist and regulationist approaches to French cities, in
particular by trying to test the hypothesis of a neo-liberalisation of the forms
of urban governance (Jouve, 2009; Béal & Rousseau, 2008).
The majority of these studies share a certain number of findings and
postulates that lead them to agree on the fact that French towns are no
longer governed as they were in the 1960s and that a series of evolutions
require the renewal of analytical frameworks. Firstly, despite the traditional
weight of the central state in economic activities, and the transformations of
capitalism and productive systems have had a strong impact on the relation-
ship between the economy and the space, in particular in the sense of a
localisation of economic interactions. These transformations, documented by
geography and economic sociology, as well by the École de la Régulation
(Boyer, 1986; Veltz, 1996; Benko and Lipietz, 2000), have re-evaluated the
role of local spaces as purveyors of positive external factors, such as re-
duced transactional costs and inducing the development of interactions be-
tween economic actors and urban government organisations. Whereas their
role in economic development had become marginal within capital concen-
tration processes, the constitution of large national groups under the guid-
ance of the state and its interventionism (Levy, 1999), the local communities
and in particular the large towns and regions, have become key actors in
economic development. This, inevitably, has had an impact on the practices
and on the socialisation modes of the elected entities and the bureaucrats
and, therefore, on the alliances and power relationships at the heart of
towns. I have documented, based on British and Italian cases, the effects of
the intensification of the connections with and between actors, who are
purveyors of urban public action resources (economic actors and social
groups, themselves purveyors of expertise), on the practices and forms of
sociability of elected urban entities and on their relationships with the elec-
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toral clientele, and on the work involved in maintaining that clientele
(Mattina, 2007; Pinson, 2009b). To summarise, the daily immersion in
policymaker networks and the mobilisation of support in the heart of social
groups that hold the resources for action tends to replace the structuring of
social groups whose only resource is the vote.
The second finding shared by these studies is the increasing complexity
of French urban societies. The studies of organisation sociologists or of the
political scientists interested in local realities pictured urban societies of the
1960s and 1970s as being relatively simple, organised around several social
groups that were relatively easy to circumscribe. This simplicity was mir-
rored in the organisation of municipal administrations, which were still fairly
meagre up until the 1970s. The simplicity of town social structures had the
advantage of facilitating the work of mobilising electoral support. All the
elected entity had to do was to obtain the support of organisations (the
church, trade unions, associations, etc.) and of opinion leaders judged able
to “hold” certain segments of local society and tap into their electoral sup-
port. The simplicity of the administrative structure facilitated the conception
of urban policies which, in essence, were in any case the responsibility of
state services. Borraz (1998 and 2000), Hoffmann-Martinot (1999), and
Jouve (2006) demonstrated in their studies how this situation evolved. The
increasing weight of the salaried middle classes, of immigration, and the
amplification of mobility and internal migrations complexified the social
structures of French cities, making more uncertain any possibility of struc-
turing urban societies into effective electoral clienteles by means of well
identified relays. The organisational proliferation that marked the structuring
of urban and metropolitan bureaucratic structures in the 1980s and 1990s
reinforced interdependence between organisations, the state, and the differ-
ent levels of local communities, considerably complicating the production of
public policies.
Verifying this increasing complexity leads directly to a third finding: that
of the transformation in the means of producing urban policy. The multipli-
cation of policy issues and fields of intervention for urban administrations,
the proliferation of actors and organisations, and the dispersion of resources
for initiatives made action devices more complex to manage. The importance
acquired by urban policies and their increasing complexity led to the instru-
mental innovations mentioned above, but they also modified the balance of
power at the heart of urban societies. Municipal, and in particular inter-
communal techno-structures, have clearly changed, gaining influence at the
expense of state representatives. Municipal and inter-communal executives,
as well as their entourage (office, experts), have progressively marginalised
councils. Social groups holding strategic resources for urban policies have
increased their capacity to access decision making processes and influence
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the latter to the detriment of groups whose only resource is the vote.
Equally, the increasing complexity of the production of urban politics has
profoundly transformed the role of the top elected officials, in particular that
of “mayors” whose role is ever less structured by activities encompassing
mediation, access to the centre to obtain the adjustment of rules or the
maintenance of electoral clienteles, and increasingly by activities related to
the production of visions and projects that lend sense and direction to policy
networks and to the mobilisation of scarce resources for policies. To qualify
this transformation of the forms of the urban political profession and exter-
nalise the difference in particular regarding the figure of the notable entity,
the term “leader” has been judged appropriate by certain authors (Le Galès
2003; Borraz and John, 2004; Pinson, 2009b).
If the use they make of the notion of “governance” can vary, however,
the scholars quoted thus far can all be located in the “governance
research field” (Pinson, 2003). They all come from a research perspective
that seeks to trace the ways in which the governance of towns has changed.
Receptive to studies on urban economic policies, they are observant of the
potential effects of transformations in capitalism on the logic of urban policy
production and on the governance of towns. They are also concerned with
the repercussions that these changes may have on the sphere of policies and
politics, on electoral competition, and on the modalities of political
socialisation of urban social groups. Today, these authors and their studies
have managed to structure French academic debate regarding local policies
around the notion of “governance”, which allows the incorporation of a
certain number of changes that have occurred in the economic policies of
towns, in urban public action, and in the forms political activities take in
towns. Within the framework of that debate, they often confront researchers
more sensitive to factors of stability and that frequently limit their approach
to politics, to political competition types, to the construction of eligibility and
electoral strongholds, and who contest the heuristic added value of that
notion of governance.
FROM CENTRE-PERIPHERY RELATIONS TO ANALYSIS OF URBAN REGIMES
It is now time to take a new step forward in the approach to studying
the forms of governance of French towns. A good way of doing so is to
look at these towns with an approach adopted by North American studies
on urban regimes. The main merit of these works is to shift the way one
looks at towns and no longer consider the vertical relations between urban
actors on the one hand, and local and central state representatives on the
other, as evidently structuring the forms that urban governance actually take.
On the contrary, the regimes approach postulates that horizontal relations, in
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other words the conflicts, cooperation, and alliances that link actors, groups,
and organisations physically present in the town, can be seen as factors that
explain, as much or even more, the actual form of urban governance.
The main tendency in French studies on local government up until the
1990s has been to minimise the role of these horizontal relations. And quite
rightly in most cases! During the period between 1950 and 1970, the central
State was the main actor in urban policies and the major role of elected
entities was to attract the attention of the State to the problematic specificities
of their town or to negotiate the way national programmes would be locally
implemented. The specific relationships between local actors and social
groups seem to have had no impact on the content of urban policies and the
way they were implemented. In political sociology studies of localities, those
horizontal social networks are almost invisible: the “notable” collects elec-
toral supports in a relatively simple fashion. These supports consent access
to the national centre, the sole place where real political careers are made and
where the resources to carry out urban policies can successfully be ob-
tained. In both cases, what happens locally only makes sense in relation to
the centre. In both cases, local spaces feature as dominated political spaces.
In both cases, these subordinate spaces are drowned in a generic category,
the “local space”, which dilutes the socio-economic specificities of the
places and does not allow for differentiating the dynamics characteristic of
towns.
The increasing complexity of urban societies, the pluralisation of political
systems, the fact that an increasing number of actors participate in designing
and implementing urban policies, and that, at the same time, the state pro-
vides fewer resources for implementing those policies successfully, render
this centre-periphery approach less and less feasible. In contrast, the gov-
ernance approach allows for the integration of the economic context and the
evolution of urban policymaking in the analysis of urban politics. As for the
urban regime approach, it enables paying even greater attention to the hori-
zontal interactions between urban actors of different natures and to urban
coalition-making processes.
Developed in the United States by Clarence Stone (1989 and 1993) and
transposed to the United Kingdom by Harding (1997 and 2000), the urban
regimes approach has, in France, rarely been taken up, with the notable
exception of the studies by Dormois (2006). This approach consists of a
synthesis of urban political economy works on the one hand and of the
intuitions of pluralism on the other. The first, mainly represented by the
works of Logan and Molotch on “growth machines” (1987), insists on the
fact that the political life of North American cities is largely structured
around conflicts opposing local social groups to the urgency, pace, and
forms of economic development in towns. With the retraction of federal
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programmes, the growth issue has become central in the politics of Ameri-
can cities, and triggers most political conflicts. In these conflicts, more often
than not, coalitions or growth machines are constituted and end up domi-
nating the political agenda. These “growth machines” are constituted, on the
one hand, by the elected urban officials who need the financial support of
the local business elites in order to be re-elected and — on the other, by
companies, real estate promoters, important land owners, local media, etc.
— who have a vested interest in the town’s growth and try, from the
beginning, to have a say regarding urban policies, and in particular on urban
planning. The application of the “growth coalition” model to French cities
and, more generally, to European towns poses a problem because the large
companies and what Logan and Molotch call “structural speculators” (pro-
moters and large private landowners) do not have the weight they have in
American towns, given the greater fragmentation of land ownership and the
weight of public or semi-public land ownership (municipality, public enter-
prises, hospitals, religious orders, etc.) (Harding, 1994). On the other hand,
the still significant weight of publicly redistributed incomes on local income
makes European elected entities much less dependent on the great local
private interests (Davezies, 2008). However, the “growth machines” ap-
proach has the advantage of looking more attentively at the major develop-
ments that have occurred in the governance of French towns. First of all,
be they on the right or on the left politically, the majority of urban govern-
ments put urban growth as their major priority. Naturally, this growth is
conceived as having to be “reasonable” or “sustainable” and cannot compro-
mise the essential amenity that constitutes the town’s standard of living
framework, but is often presented as an insurmountable horizon. Subse-
quently, one observes in the coalitions mobilised around urban politics in
France, as in the American “growth machines”, the involvement of institu-
tions and local agencies such as the local media, the universities, and also
cultural institutions who all have a vested interest in growth. The pluralist
approaches (Dahl, 1971), whose studies on the regimes recognise heredity,
in turn insist on the great number of actors and organisations intervening in
urban governance and the dispersion of resources (financial, expertise, and
in particular, political legitimacy). These approaches insist more heavily than
political economy approaches do, on the considerable importance that actors
and political institutions can have, even in a capitalist context that grants a
systemic advantage to those who hold capital. That weight can be expressed
by the capacity to mobilise electoral support for a development project or by
the grip officials can have on the regulatory framework through which urban
development has to go.
The synthesis proposed by the urban regimes approach takes into con-
sideration, firstly, that in a capitalist economy there is always a strong
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possibility that there will be a “systemic bias” in urban politics favouring
economic interests. That has always been the case in the United States,
where towns collect their main fiscal revenues from the presence of com-
panies. It is also increasingly the case in French towns where, although the
resources distributed by the state or from social redistribution systems play
a greater part in the local economy, it is nevertheless true that the elected
officials have their eyes fixed on the departures and the arrivals of compa-
nies. These pressures exerted on urban government in a capitalist regime
lead to, according to these authors, the constitution of government coali-
tions, “urban regimes”, bonding government institutions and certain major
economic interests in a lasting relationship. Furthermore, the regimes theory
is more interested in the nature of the relationships linking the actors in-
volved, and draws conclusions close to those of the pluralists. The systems
of urban actors of American towns are characterized by a high level of
complexity, fragmentation, and interdependence amongst actors and by the
dispersion of resources. The central challenge of urban governance — it is
no longer time for the elected entities to decide unilaterally, but to “introduce
enough cooperation between the various elements that constitute the com-
munity in order to actually make things happen” (Stone, 1989, p. 227).
Thus, the situations that pluralism entails render futile the resort to hierar-
chical leadership as a coordination mode. Cooperation comes instead from
the capacity of elected officials and their administration to interest actors in
their urban policies. This capacity comes from the stabilisation of govern-
ance arrangements, from the relations of trust and reciprocity between au-
tonomous and interdependent actors. The relations are self perpetuating
thanks to modes of action and interaction that do not question the autonomy
of actors. Little by little, the stabilisation of these trusting relationships gen-
erates a capacity to cooperate and act collectively. The regime becomes the
matrix for the city’s capacity for collective action. Identified as such by
coalition members, the regime becomes an asset worthy of being protected
by each participant.
Finally, the picture drawn by the theory of urban regimes seems to be
able to describe, with some subtle and occasional differences, the situation
of French cities and their modes of governance. These towns are subject,
more than previously, to the transformations of capitalism and are less
protected by the state’s umbrella and by Keynesian policies. The challenges
of economic development, competitiveness, and attractiveness have become
central issues. Urban elites are required to define a position in territorial
competition, whereas the state provides almost no expertise or important
guidelines on the subject. Therefore, projects are defined locally. On the
other hand, the growing dependence with regard to private investment
makes the urban elites ever more attentive to economic actors, which means
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that, even when they are not physically present in French urban regimes,
their supposed interests are broadly taken into consideration. As urban so-
cieties are increasingly required to build up their own projects, they simul-
taneously become more polycentric and pluralist. As the actors representing
the state began to take a back seat, urban actors systems became occupied
by an increasing number of local groups and organisations. As the links with
the centre lose their strategic character, the most evident challenge of urban
governance becomes that of making the pluralism of urban actor systems
prosper, of making it compatible with the constitution of a capacity for
action. The challenges involved in mobilisation, coordination, the building of
stable coalitions, and the constitution of the town as a collective actor have
become central issues. Innovation in terms of tools for urban public actions
(associations, contracts, projects, pacts, charters), the emphasis on the
major mobilising initiatives (large urban projects, strategic planning, major
events, etc.) (Pinson, 2002) are all relevant elements revealing the impor-
tance taken on by the densification and management of horizontal relations
in urban governance.
CONCLUSION: SOUTHERN EUROPEAN URBAN REGIMES?
The regimes approach has considerable merits. It allows for the recon-
ciliation of political economy approaches and policy analysis approaches that
are more sensitive to the inherent complexity of drafting and implementing
urban policies and to the interdependent dynamics between actors. This
approach also incorporates features that French political science very often
neglects: the fact that cities are socially, economically, and politically com-
plex phenomena, polycentric ecosystems in which questions regarding the
coordination and mobilisation of actors around public policies and the inte-
gration of social systems are always emerging differently from that able to
be observed somewhere else. Finally, because this approach perceives how
coalitions within urban governance will always be dependent on the locally
prevailing “social equation”, the urban regimes approach is sensitive to the
question of differentiation between the forms of urban governance within the
context of the same national governance. Furthermore, what transnational
studies on urban governance today demonstrate (Le Galès, 1993; Sellers,
2002; Pinson, 2009a) is that the infra-national variations can be more impor-
tant than international variations.
No doubt one must henceforth try to qualify what could be the unique
characteristics of European urban regimes, in particular the Southern Euro-
pean. Southern European regimes grant a much more important place to
actors and organisation, which Stone tends to neglect: technical networks,
735
The governance of French towns
planning professionals, agencies, public and semi-public enterprises and their
staff, infrastructural managers, and cultural institutions. These actors often
occupy a more decisive place than do economic actors. Furthermore, public
actors and institutions or semi-public institutions have, undoubtedly, a larger
role given the historic importance that political regulations and welfare systems
have. Top urban elected officials undoubtedly occupy a choice place in these
regimes. They play an essential role in the mobilisation of the urban society
components and in the construction of mobilising images and messages. One
might perhaps propose that the reflex and interest in organising and mobilising
oneself at the urban level is, without doubt, less rooted in groups that compose
European urban societies than in their North American equivalents. In Europe,
the state, even when withdrawn, is above all, a “state of mind”.
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